In this paper we discuss cronyism that exists between superiors and subordinates. Cronyism is defined as favoritism shown by the superior to his or her subordinate based on their relationship, rather than the latter's capability or qualification, in exchange for the latter's personal loyalty. We argue that two cultural antecedents, namely particularism and paternalism, give rise to strong ingroup bias and unreserved personal loyalty, which in turn lead to cronyism. We examine the consequences of cronyism at the individual level with (...) respect to job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and ingratiation. We also discuss how cronyism affects performance, morale, and inertia at the organizational level. Cronyism can be observed in all cultures; however, its manifestation is likely to vary from one culture to another. (shrink)

In “Generalizing Generalizability in Information Systems Research,” Lee and Baskerville try to clarify generalization and classify it into four types. Unfortunately, their account is problematic. We propose repairs. Central among these is our balance-of-evidence argument that we should adopt the view that Hume’s problem of induction has a solution, even if we do not know what it is. We build upon this by proposing an alternative classification of induction. There are five types of generalization: theoretical, within-population, cross-population, contextual, and temporal, (...) with theoretical generalization being across the empirical and theoretical levels and the rest within the empirical level. Our classification also includes two kinds of inductive reasoning that do not belong to the domain of generalization. We then discuss the implications of our classification for information systems research. (shrink)

Lee and Baskerville (2003) attempted to clarify the concept of generalization and classify it into four types. In Tsang and Williams (2012) we objected to their account of generalization as well as their classification and offered repairs. Then we proposed a classification of induction, within which we distinguished five types of generalization. In their (2012) rejoinder, they argue that their classification is compatible with ours, claiming that theirs offers a ‘new language.’ Insofar as we resist this ‘new language’ and insofar (...) as they think that our position commits us to positivism and the rejection of interpretivism, they conclude both that our classification is more restrictive than theirs and also that we embrace ‘paradigmatic domination.’ Lee and Baskerville’s classification of generalization is based on a distinction between theoretical and empirical statements. Accordingly we will first clarify the terms ‘theoretical statement’ and ‘empirical statement.’ We note that they find no fault with our classification of induction, we re-state our main objections to their classification that remain unanswered and we show that their classification of generalizing is in fact incompatible with ours. We argue that their account of generalization retains fatal flaws, which means it should not be relied upon. We demonstrate that our classification is not committed to any paradigm and so we do not embrace ‘paradigmatic domination.’. (shrink)

In Generalizing Generalizability in Information Systems Research Lee and Baskerville (2003) attempt to clarify generalization and distinguish four types of generalization. Although this is a useful objective, what they call generalization is often not generalization at all in the proper sense of the word. We elucidate generalization by locating their major errors. A main source of these is their failure to understand the depth of Hume’s problem of induction. We give a thorough explication of the problem and then give a (...) solution. Lastly, we propose an alternative taxonomy of generalization: theoretical, within-population, cross-population, contextual, and temporal. (shrink)

In ‘Generalization and Induction: Misconceptions, Clarifications, and a Classification of Induction’, we comment on Lee and Baskerville’s paper ‘Generalizing Generalizability in Information Systems Research’, which attempts to clarify the concept of generalization and classify it into four types. Our commentary discusses the misconceptions in their paper and proposes an alternative classification of induction. Their response ‘Conceptualizing Generalizability: New Contributions and a Reply’ perpetuates their misconceptions and create new ones. The purpose of this rejoinder is to highlight the major problems both (...) in their original paper and in their reply and to provide further clarifications. Lee and Baskerville’s so-called ‘new language’ of describing research activities based on their concept of generalization is confusing. Their classification abuses the term ‘generalize’ and is self-contradictory. Hence, contrary to their claim, their classification and ours are not compatible. Also contrary to their claim that we advocate paradigmatic domination, our commentary is just about the correct use of terms such as ‘generalize’, ‘induction’ and ‘deduction’. (shrink)